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Doctrinal Problems of Fraud Law
Page Keeton*

T

of the Cleveland-Marshall Law Review
is to be commended for making and carrying out the decision to publish this symposium issue on Fraud and Misrepresentation. The legal rules and principles related to the general
question as to when an alleged misrepresentation will serve as a
basis for any kind of relief in favor of the prejudiced party to a
bargaining transaction are being constantly adjusted to meet new
marketing practices and the ingenuity of mankind either to avoid
unfavorable transactions or to induce favorable ones. It can be
said without fear of contradiction that both case law and legislation during this century evidence an ever-widening recognition of the idea that the reasonable expectations of those entering into bargaining transactions should not be frustrated through
deceptive practices and even innocent and non-negligent misrepresentations.
It should be apparent, however, that the creation of new
rules and principles rejecting the individualistic philosophy of
the Nineteenth Century that was summed up in this area of the
law by the maxim caveat emptor, and requiring a higher standard
of ethics in the negotiation of bargaining transactions render such
transactions much less secure. Therefore, the social interest in
the security of bargaining transactions must be weighed against
the social interest in maintaining high standards in the conduct
of economic affairs. In this connection, practical problems involving the limits to effective legislation have been faced by the
courts in dealing with alleged oral promises and oral misrepresentations that were not incorporated into a later written document that was either required under the Statute of Frauds or
that the parties voluntarily chose to make. It is obvious that a
person who exercises poor judgment and makes a bad bargain
will often claim that he was misled by a misrepresentation of the
other party to the transaction. This is a factor relating to the
proper treatment of disclaimer clauses, that is clauses reciting
that a particular party or his agent has made no representations
or promises other than those included in the final written transHE EDITORIAL STAFF
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action. Greater liberality in the granting of relief has brought
about an increase in the use of such disclaimer clauses. The
issue in such cases is the extent to which it is possible, if at all,
for businessmen to deal at arm's length and agree that one of
the parties, usually a purchaser, is not relying on any alleged
oral representations. It is inevitable that there would be disagreement about some of the close questions raised, especially
when dishonesty or scienter is not established and when other
sources of information to obtain the truth were readily available.'
The gradual erosion of the requirement that dishonesty or
scienter be established for relief for a misrepresentation, especially damages, raises in a different way the legal effect of the
representee's contributory negligence in relying on the representation. Different results have been reached and may justifiably be reached depending upon the relief sought, whether rescission or damages, and if damages whether or not damages are
to be measured on the basis of the out-of-pocket principle or the
benefit-of-the-bargain rule.2 If the innocent misrepresenter is a
party to the contract, then perhaps a restoration of the parties
to status quo either by way of rescission or "out-of-pocket" damages would be sound notwithstanding the contributory negligence
of the prejudiced party, but it does not necessarily follow that
the misrepresenter who is not a party to the contract should be
responsible absent dishonesty nor does it mean that a party to
the contract should be responsible for damages measured on a
3
benefit-of-the-bargain basis.

This much has been said by way of indicating that legal
doctrine related to fraud and mistake constitutes a compromise
between competing social interests.
1 Dannan Realty Co. v. Harris, 5 N. Y. 2d 317, 157 N. E. 2d 597 (1959)

(disclaimer clause in the purchase and sale of a leasehold interest); Wittenburg
v. Robinov, 9 N. Y. 2d 261, 173 N. E. 2d 868 (1961) (disclaimer clause in sale
of land); Woodruff & Sons v. Brown, 256 F. 2d 391 (5th Cir. 1958) (disclaimer clause in sale of onion seed). See, Seavey, Caveat Emptor as of
1960, 38 Tex. L. Rev. 439 (1960); Comment, The "Merger Clause" and the
Parol Evidence Rule, 27 Tex. L. Rev. 361 (1949).
2 Taylor v. Arneill, 129 Colo. 185, 268 P. 2d 695 (1954), noted 27 Rocky Mt.
L. Rev. 115 (1954); Bishop v. Strout Realty Agency, Inc., 182 F. 2d 503 (4th
Cir. 1950).
3 A substantial minority of jurisdictions now clearly adopt the strict liability
rule for out-of-pocket damages against a party to the transaction. Before
strict liability is imposed upon one who is not a party to the contract, it is
submitted that the issue as to whether he is the more logical risk bearer
should be squarely faced just as the courts are now doing as regards physical harm resulting from non-negligent conduct, especially in the area of
products liability.
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